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Abstract
Reverse engineering is a current threat to both the military and the commer-
cial sector of system. One method for protecting the system against the threat of
reverse engineering is obfuscation. The obfuscation could transform an internal logic
of system into an equivalent one that is harder to reverse-engineer. In a recent re-
search, Yasinsac and McDonald proposed the Random Program Model (RPM) which
consists of randomly selecting sub-circuits from original circuits and replacing these
sub-circuits with randomly selected, semantically equivalent new one for a circuit ob-
fuscation and implemented such obfuscation techniques in Java, which is referred to
Circuit Obfuscation via Randomization of Graphs Iteratively (CORGI) [6].
The previous obfuscation methods in CORGI are mainly focusing on hiding the
structural and functional information on a circuit against white-box analysis. In other
words, the final variants from the previous version of CORGI are likely to leak the
significant information through the side-channel such as time, power consumption, and
electro-magnetic emission. For this reason, this research primarily focuses on hiding
the side-channel information rather than the internal structure of circuit. This is the
first known work that focuses on generalized side-channel signature characterization
and provides the tool to minimize the signature leakage.
In this effort, the proposed research is conducted in four steps, namely the
circuit signature estimation, characterization, signature manipulation, and signature
validation. During the signature estimation and characterization phase, the power
signature of the circuit is estimated both statically and dynamically via probabilistic
signature estimation, then verified with dynamic simulation with HSPICE. Once the
signature is estimated by both static and dynamic techniques, the signature of the
circuit is characterized and classified as one of the four predefined power signature.
After characterization phase, a power signature manipulation method is applied to
iv
alter its original power signature to a different class of power signature. Finally, the
altered power signature is verified via both static and dynamic signature analysis. In
addition, the proposed signature manipulation method is applied on RSA circuit on
Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA against adversarial power analysis. Ultimately, this research
expects that the new signature manipulation method in this research can give more
burdens to adversarial to compromise critical systems.
v
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COMBINATIONAL CIRCUIT OBFUSCATION
THROUGH POWER SIGNATURE MANIPULATION
I. Introduction
In our modern world, protecting one’s own intellectual property is important. Like-
wise, because of increases in the importance of the intellectual property contained in
software and hardware, protecting properties from adversarial actions is of great inter-
est to both military and civilian communities. Traditionally the conceptual distinction
between hardware and software has been apparently divided in that the hardware is
usually referred to as logic circuit designs on the physical technology but the soft-
ware is referred to as a set of codes or instructions [19]. With the increasing use of
hardware description languages, however, circuits are increasingly implemented in a
software-like manner.
In this context, there will soon cease to be a distinction between logic circuit
designs for implementation in physical hardware and logic circuit designs implemented
as software. In other words, any circuit can easily be mapped to a piece of software
which computes the same functions. A general software, in turn, could be translated to
logic circuits. Based on this assumption, rather than viewing the two as distinguished
categories, hardware protection and software protection both will be regarded as a
circuit protection in our research.
1.1 Motivation
Protecting a smart card is one of the good examples in the domain of this
research. Such a smart card can be applied in many applications such as mobile
communications, banking, and electronic signatures. Since 2008, the Dutch public
transit system has used special plastic cards with an embedded smart chip that allows
passengers to use all transportation throughout the entire country without having to
1
buy individual tickets [21]. But, those cards were successfully attacked by students
and hackers. One of attackers, Karsten Nohl [15], released his approach of deducing
functionality from circuit images and applying it to the internal circuitry of the transit
card at the Black Hat 2008 security conference. Breaking the Mifare Classic chip using
Nohl’s approach makes it possible for anyone to use all transportation in Holland at
no cost. As a result, the Dutch government invested about $2 billion in their new
transit system to cover its weakness from adversarial reverse-engineering attacks.
Unlike Nohl’s approach in the Dutch public transit system, there is another
method for revealing the secrets of smart cards. This method have been proposed
that use side-channel information such as timing measurements, power consumption,
electromagnetic emissions and faulty hardware [22]. Of all the sources of side-channel
information, power measurements are the most difficult to control [8]. Current techno-
logical constraints result in different power consumptions when manipulating a logical
one compared to manipulating a logical zero [22]. An attacker of a smartcard can
monitor such power differences and obtain useful side-channel information. Kocher
et al. [8] claim one can monitor the actions of a single transistor within a smartcard
using such a power analysis. In [8], the authors outline a specific power analysis attack
against smartcards running the encryption algorithm.
From these lessons learned, it is motivated that circuit protections are extremely
significant for preventing these types of attacks on both critical software and hardware.
With these motivation, our research group has considered circuit protection for em-
bedded systems and developed several methods to prevent from reverse-engineering.
This research assume that one of the known methods for protection from reverse-
engineering is obfuscation which means the ability to efficiently rewrite a program so
that an adversary gains no advantage beyond having observable program with input
and output behavior.
2
1.2 Problem Statement
Program Encryption Group (PEG) had developed obfuscation algorithms and
techniques for achieving white-box protection by hiding functional and structural in-
formation in circuits. However, the previous white-box obfuscation technique does
not check nor provide protection against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. The
circuit variants generated by CORGI might be particularly susceptible to SCA at-
tacks which is performed by the information such as timing, power consumption,
electromagnetic radiation, heat, noise, and more. With these side-channel informa-
tion, an adversary can gain access to the internal of a circuit and break an encryption
technique on a circuit without having the internal structural and functional informa-
tion. In many cases, attacker can combine side-channel information with the observed
structural or functional information of a circuit to exploit it [1]. Therefore, it is reason-
able for this research to start focusing on the circuit protection against side-channel
analysis.
1.3 Research Objectives and Contributions
The objective of this research is to detect and characterize power signature which
is the abstract form of power consumption during operation, and to manipulate such
a signature to increase the level of obfuscation. To achieve the objective, this research
is broken down into four different sections with an ultimate goal of manipulating the
side-channel information.
1. Estimation and Simulation
2. Characterization and Classification
3. Implementation and Manipulation
4. Evaluation and Validation
1.3.1 Estimation and Simulation. The power signature estimation is per-
formed by the two approaches, namely static and dynamic approach. The static ap-
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proach is achieved in probabilistic and statistical way without dynamic factors such
as input patterns. Additionally, it is implemented on CORGI, which is referred to
as Signature IDentification (SID) system. Dynamic approach, on the other hand, is
performed by simulation process using an external tool considering input patterns.
This dynamic simulation technique provides better accuracy compared to static one
since it operates at the transistor level and its output is varied depending on input
patterns.
1.3.2 Characterization and Classification. The estimated circuit’s signa-
tures from the previous section need to be characterized and classified. This is in
order to set a baseline and a metric for evaluating how much the signature is changed
after applying manipulation process.
1.3.3 Implementation and Manipulation. To achieve the primary goal of
this research, power signature manipulation technique is designed and implemented
on CORGI, which is called a Signature Manipulator(SM). SM is capable of providing a
suitable transformation of the power signature of the circuit by manipulating switching
activity of a circuit.
1.3.4 Evaluation and Validation. In order to evaluate the final circuit vari-
ant generated by SM, dynamic and static estimation approaches are used again to
measure how much the signature is manipulated from the original one. Lastly, it is
needed to validate the final variant obtained by the power signature manipulation
method whether it provides the protection of the secret key from adversarial power
analysis. The proposed signature manipulation method is applied on RSA circuit on
Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA against adversarial power analysis.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides an
overview of background information in the realms of software obfuscation and side-
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channel analysis. Chapter III defines our methodology which includes a technique that
measures power signature in dynamic and static ways, characterizes the signature,
manipulates the circuit’s signature using new manipulation algorithm, evaluates the
proposed method using static and dynamic analysis, and validates the final variant
using the FPGA based Encryption system test-bed. Chapter IV presents the results
of experiments using power signature estimation and manipulation techniques, and
Chapter V gives our conclusions along with our contributions and discussion of future
work for the power signature manipulation method.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter presents a background review of the literature pertaining to a circuit
obfuscation technique against SCA attack. We organize this chapter in the following
manner. Section 2.1 describes the concept of reverse engineering, Section 2.2 pro-
vides a brief introduction to obfuscation principles and previous circuit obfuscation
techniques including the overview of CORGI, Section 2.3 introduces the side-channel
attacks, and Section 2.4 covers the concepts of power dissipation model and the dif-
ferent types of power analysis.
2.1 Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering is the process of analyzing a system to recognize the sys-
tem’s components and their interrelationships, and to create representations of the
system in another form or at a higher level of abstraction [3]. There are different
reasons for reverse engineering. The first one is creating the necessary documenta-
tion for maintenance, strengthen enhancement, or support replacement. A second
reason is an adversarial purpose for compromising the existing technology by an in-
dustrial spy [11]. From the view of software engineering, reverse engineering is the
reverse process of forward engineering [2]. Forward engineering consists of moving
from high-level abstractions and logical, implementation-independent designs to the
physical implementation of a system. In other words, it is a process of taking require-
ments, and creating designs and an implementation from these requirements [3]. This
process is shown in Figure 2.1. Whereas forward engineering ends with a software
product, reverse engineering starts with the product and is going backward of forward
engineering.
2.1.1 Black-Box Analysis. The main purpose of black box analysis is to
predict the intent of a system based on only its inputs and outputs without any
information related to as internal structure of system. In the case of logic circuits,
black-box analysis is the simplest way to reverse engineer a circuit in a brute force
approach [12]. Identifying the overall function requires enumerating all possible input
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Figure 2.1: The Concept of Reverse/Forward Engineering [2]
Figure 2.2: Black-Box Analysis [12]
combinations and evaluating the circuit’s output. This is impractical for a circuit
with a large number of inputs due to the requirement of a high computing power and
large search space.
2.1.2 White-Box Analysis. Unlike black-box analysis, white-box analysis
focuses on the internal structure of a system. This approach provides an adversary
with a better functional understanding than black-box analysis because it can be
performed without having enumerating all possible input combinations. Adversaries
can directly access the underlying white-box structure of a circuit in the real world.
Therefore, protecting against white-box analysis is much more challenging than black-
box protection. White-box protection has been the primary focus in the PEG research
group.
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Figure 2.3: White-Box Analysis [12]
2.2 Circuit Obfuscation
This research assume that general programs are themselves abstractions of
Boolean logic because they have collections of straight-line logic. Thus, a program
logic can be represented in a software as Boolean logic circuits [6]. In this regard,
there is a connection between protecting original functions of circuit and protecting
a software, either directly or indirectly. For this reason, protecting circuits is the pri-
mary focus of PEG’s research to make secure software. To hide programmatic logic or
original functions of circuit, obfuscation is one of known protections against reverse
engineering. Obfuscation is a process that produces a semantically equivalent variant
of a program. Thus, the obfuscated program still has the same number of inputs and
outputs and performs the same logic function but has a different white-box struc-
ture [6]. This obfuscation technique based on the white-box structure of a program
attempts to confuse a reverse engineer.
2.2.1 CORGI. To achieve the main purpose of the program encryption
group, McDonald and Kim developed Java-based a circuit obfuscator known as Cir-
cuit Obfuscation via Randomization of Graphs Iteratively CORGI at the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT). CORGI mainly provides the feature of representa-
tion and obfuscation of a combinational circuit. As seen in Figure 2.4, The first
version of CORGI, called CORGI 1.0, provides a random based obfuscation tech-
nique, namely random sub-circuit selection and replacement. Since then, algorithms
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Figure 2.4: Revision History and Proposed Features in CORGI
and techniques for circuit obfuscation have been improved. In 2010, CORGI 2.0 was
designed in a deterministic approach for obfuscation method. Additionally, CORGI
2.0 provides component-level obfuscation technique rather than a single gate-level
technique against a white-box analysis attack. Now, this research, on the other hand,
is toward to version 3.0 in order to achieve the signature protection against an adver-
sarial side-channel analysis attack.
2.2.2 Random Sub-Circuit Selection and Replacement. Random SSRMethod
selects a sub-circuit in the entire original circuit at random and then replaces it by
requesting a sub-circuit to be replaced from the circuit library(CXL). Then, CXL
provides a random, semantically equivalent sub-circuits. From this action, the orig-
inal sub-circuit is removed from the circuit, and the sub-circuit obtained from CXL
is inserted into the original place. This is not a single step, but an iterative process.
9
But such a random SSR does not guarantee that the final circuit variant from the
large number of iterations will be more secure.
2.2.3 Component Identification. Parham [16] focused on larger set of gates
than a single gate. Such a set of gates is called a component. Component consists
of one or more gates which has an own function such as a multiplexer and an adder.
Therefore, it is possible for an adversary to focus their attention on such a compo-
nent after they failed for the reverse-engineering by knowing a gate level structure
alone. For this reason, Parham designed a component identification tool based on
the assumption that adversaries may use component identification techniques for de-
termining the overall function of the system [16]. The component ID enumerates a
sub-circuit and compares it with the known pre-defined components in a library. If
the matched sub-circuit were found, the component was identified. This algorithm
makes it possible to automatically identify the existing component without visual
searching process. But, the pre-defined library modules are limited for applying pos-
sible components and circuits. For example, if there is a circuit having components
which does not exist in a library, it is not possible to identify the components in the
circuit.
2.2.4 Component Fusion. In order to overcome the limitation on random
SSR in CORGI 1.0, Koranek developed new obfuscation method in CORGI 2.0, which
is called component fusion [13]. Component Fusion provides a deterministic selection
strategy instead of random selection. With the new obfuscation method, the obfusca-
tor selects both components identified by Parham’s component ID tool and the sub-
circuits connecting to the identified components for replacement. Next, component
fusion synthesize all selected gates together to eliminate the border of components.
This is accomplished by using the ESPRESSO two-level optimizer [13]. As a result,
component fusion contributes to prevent from discovering components in a circuit.
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Figure 2.5: Component Encryption [13]
2.2.5 Component Encryption. Component fusion guarantees to hide the
existing components in a circuit, but it might still remain the original signals in a
circuit. To overcome this limitation on component fusion, Koranek [13] developed
another deterministic method for obfuscating the existing signals in a circuit - Com-
ponent Encryption. As seen in Figure 2.5, component encryption is implemented by
selecting the signals between components, generating encryption and decryption logic
on the connected components, and then synthesizing the generated logic and the each
connected component. With component encryption, the number of signals and the
semantics between components are successfully changed.
2.3 Side-Channel Attacks
Even if the circuitry is protected from the reverse engineering attack based on
white-box analysis, the circuitry might still leak significant information related to
the circuit’s function. An attacks on a circuit using leaked side information is called
a side-channel attack. Side-channel attacks are mainly divided into the categories
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of Timing Analysis Attacks(TA), Fault Injection Attacks(FA), and Power Analysis
Attacks(PA) [12].
1. Timing Analysis: Timing Analysis is the method which focuses on the vari-
ation of the timing in processing by modifying the speed of the circuit clock,
either speeding it up or slowing it down to achieve a desired information about
the circuit implementation.
2. Fault Injection: The purpose of fault injection is to cause the targeted digital
system or circuity to be malfunction to reveal useful information for additional
attacks. Fault injections include a variety of attacks:raising voltage glitches and
clock glitches, modifying the temperature, and so on.
3. Power Consumption Analysis: By observing the power usage across a
circuit, an attacker can gain insight into what signals are changing the most in
the circuit. Particularly, if a circuit is being used to compute some mathematical
function, more power will be used in the area of the circuit dedicated to this
function.
Of course, there are other types of side channel attacks. However, the previous three
techniques are the main technologies known as the side-channel attacks on digital sys-
tems. This research tries to prevent combinational circuits from power consumption
analysis as well as white box analysis.
2.4 Power Analysis
In general, power analysis techniques are performed by obtaining the power
transient directly from physical circuitry with physical equipments as shown in Figure
2.6. However it is very costly to set up the all physical environments for power analysis.
As an alternative, power analysis for CMOS digital circuits can be done at several
levels of abstractions [20]. The techniques can be divided into from low-level technique
to statistical and probabilistic technique by trading off between accuracy and speed.
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Figure 2.6: The integrated equipments for power analysis(http://www.riscure.com)
2.4.1 Power Dissipation Model . In general, power is a secondary consider-
ation behind speed and area for many chips. As chip density and operating frequency
increases, power consumption skyrockets and becomes the primary concern in terms
of high performance and life-time for CMOS design [14]. Various methods [10] to
estimate power consumption have been proposed for low-power design. Even if the
general purpose of power estimation is different from the purpose of this research,
power analysis attacks (and more generally side-channel attacks) are also performed
by using the power dissipation model. For this reason, the fundamental power con-
sumption model will be discussed in this section. The power consumption in a digital
system is given by the following expression [14]:
Ptotal = Pdynamic + Pshort + Pstatic (2.1)
where:
Ptotal : Total power dissipation;
Pdynamic : Dynamic circuit power dissipation;
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Pshort : Short circuit power dissipation;
Pstatic : Static circuit power dissipation
The three terms in the order written represent the dynamic, short, and static
dissipation respectively of the circuit [14] [18]. The second term, short dissipation
refers to the power consumed due to the small current from source to ground appearing
at the output of a CMOS gate during switching from one logic level to another, at
the moment that both output transistors drive current [7]. In more technical terms,
current can only flow while both pMOS and nMOS networks are partially ON.
Pshort = VDD
∑
i
Ishort (2.2)
Where:
VDD : supply voltage;
Ishort : short circuit current
The third term, static dissipation, Pstatic, does not depend on the circuit activity
and is determined by the target technology, undesired short circuits and (MOSFET)
leakage current. This static power dissipation is the product of total leakage current
and the supply voltage.
Pstatic = VDDIstatic (2.3)
Where:
VDD : supply voltage;
Istatic : leakage current
The most important term among the three terms is the first one, namely the
dynamic dissipation, since it is consumed by charging and discharging the parasitic
capacitors present in all circuit nodes. Additionally, it is known that the dynamic
power usually accounts for about 70% of the power consumed in a combinational
circuit [7]. Thus, the power in a digital CMOS circuit can be determined using the
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following formula for dynamic power:
Pdynamic =
∑
i
V 2DDCloadα0→1f (2.4)
VDD is the supply voltage at node i, and Cload is the load capacitance at node i.
α0→1 is the power consuming switching activity at node i, and f is the frequency of
operation of the circuit [18].
To make more sense of the previous expression, let us begin by reviewing more
definitions for deriving the average power dissipation over some time interval T.
Pdynamic =
E
T
=
1
T
∫ T
o
P (t)dt =
1
T
∫ T
o
iDD(t)VDDdt (2.5)
Where:
E : energy consumed over the interval ;
T : time interval;
P (t): instantaneous power on time t;
iDD : supply current;
VDD : supply voltage;
Based on the previous expression, the average dynamic power can be written
as:
Pavg−dynamic =
1
T
∫ T
o
iDD(t)VDDdt = V
2
DDCloadfswitching (2.6)
Since most gates do not switch every clock cycle, it is often more convenient
to express switching frequency fswitching as an activity factor α0→1 times the clock
frequency f. Now the average power dissipation may be rewritten as:
Pdynamic = α0→1V
2
DDCloadf (2.7)
Where:
α0→1 : the probability of a 0 → 1 power consuming transition.
15
By reviewing the power dissipation model so far, it is learned that the power
consumption in CMOS devices is proportional to the switching activity. Thus, α0→1
is the principal parameter for the domain in an adversarial power analysis as well as
general low-power circuit design.
2.4.2 Simple Power Analysis (SPA). SPA is one of the attacking method for
a cryptography system. It is implemented by directly interpreting power consumption
during cryptographic operations to recovering the main key or logic in a system [8].
By observing the power consumption on a smart card, SPA can directly attack the
secret key information embedded in the card since the amount of power consumed
varies depending on the microprocessor instruction performed. For example, SPA can
be used for breaking RSA or DES implementations by revealing differences during the
cryptographic operations. It is known that many current smart cards are vulnerable
to SPA [9].
2.4.3 Differential Power Analysis (DPA). DPA has a much more compli-
cated process, and is much more difficult to prevent than SPA. SPA is more likely
to observe the power consumption, on the other hand, DPA uses the technique for
statistical analysis and error correction to extract the exact correlated to secret keys.
DPA has largely two steps: Data collection and data analysis [9]. Data collection is
implemented by sampling the power consumption for a smart card during the cryp-
tographic operations. Data analysis is performed by reducing the unnecessary signals
and applying digital signal interpretation and statistical technique to conduct attacks.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition
The fundamental goal in the program encryption group is to provide combina-
tional circuit protections by proposing more secure and advanced methods for circuit
obfuscation in order to increase the cost of reverse engineering. To meet this goal,
PEG has proposed various methods for obfuscating a combinational circuit based
on hiding the structural and functional information of the original circuit against
a white-box analysis. The structural information normally means the information
about the number and the type of gates, signals, components, and so on. However,
this research focuses more on dealing with the side-channel information than on the
structural information for obfuscating a combinational circuit.
As discussed in Chapter II, observing power consumption over a circuit is the
most well-known method among the wide variety of side-channel attacks. The main
functionality or the encryption key in a circuit could be easily detected by using the
power analysis attacks. Therefore, our method in this research takes into account
manipulating the power signature of the original circuit.
The process for this research is divided into four steps as follows:
1. Estimation and Simulation
- Estimating power signature using an internal tool in static approach and sim-
ulating a circuit using an external tool in the dynamic approach
2. Characterization and Classification
- Characterizing the original power signature and classifying it by the pre-defined
four types of power signature patterns
3. Implementation and Manipulation
- Implementing Signature Manipulator (SM) in CORGI and manipulating the
original power signature by using SM
4. Evaluation and Validation
- Evaluating the SM using static and dynamic analysis and validating the pro-
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posed method applying on Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA against an adversarial power
analysis.
The first step is an estimation and simulation to measure power signature for
combinational circuit using an internal and external tool. For power estimation, two
approaches are executed in this research, namely static and dynamic technique. Static
approach is performed in probabilistic and statistical way by using an internal tool,
which is referred to as SID. In static approach, SID can provides the predictable power
signature from the switching activity estimation technique without considering input
pattern. In dynamic approach, simulation process is executed by using SPICE simula-
tor, which is one of the well-known circuit simulators to simulate power consumption
of a circuit at the transistor level under dynamic input patterns. Second, characteri-
zation and classification are performed. This process mainly focuses on characterizing
the original power signature and classifying it as one of the four predefined power sig-
nature patterns. Third, implementation and manipulation processes are executed for
the primary goal of this research which is to transform the class of the original power
signature. Signature Manipulator (SM) is designed by manipulating the amount of
switching activity. Lastly, evaluation and validation processes will be performed to
quantify how much power signature is transformed by the proposed signature manip-
ulation techniques and to verify the ability to protect an encryption key in the circuit
against adversarial power analysis.
3.2 Estimation and Simulation
As mentioned previous, this section discusses both static and dynamic ap-
proaches for estimating power signature in combinational circuits. The static tech-
nique is performed without the circuit’s input pattern. It can provide an power sig-
nature in statistical and probabilistic way based on the assumption that the circuit’s
inputs are uniformly distributed. For this reason, this technique is referred as static.
This simplified no simulation-based approach is implemented in CORGI, which is
called SID. In dynamic technique, on the other hand, the final result can be varied
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depending on what type of the input patterns. Thus, this technique is called dynamic.
The dynamic approach is performed by simulation process given pseudo-random or
user-defined input vectors per clock cycle.
3.2.1 Static Approach . These types of techniques usually attempt to es-
timate an average power dissipation in a probabilistic and statistical way without
considering dynamic factors such as an input pattern. These no simulation-based
techniques are referred to as static approach in this research. The easiest way to
predict power signature in this static approach can be performed by just looking at
the overall structure of circuit. For instance, Figure 3.1 provides two examples of a
circuit’s structure. In Figure 3.1(a), front-loaded shape of power signature can be
predicted, because most gates are located in the front part of circuit. Likewise, in the
Figure 3.1(b), rear-loaded shape of power signature can be expected by the overall
structure of a circuit. But, it is not easy for this technique to apply every other cases.
In order to achieve more accurate result, this research examines the previous works
for static approach. From the previous works, it is found that most techniques in
this approach focus on the dynamic circuit power dissipation among three factors of
Eq.2.1, power dissipation model, as seen in Chapter II, because the dynamic circuit
power dissipation usually accounts for about 70% of the power consumed in a com-
binational circuit [18]. Thus, most methods aimed at optimizing this term will have
the highest effect on static power signature estimation and manipulation.
Pdynamic = α0→1V
2
DDCloadf (3.1)
As seen in Eq.3.1, the parameters of the dynamic power expression consist of
VDD, Cload, f, and α0→1 as explained in chapter II. At the logic-level, the switching
activity of a circuit, α0→1 is the prime factor out of four terms for static power
estimation and manipulation in this research. It is widely accepted that the switching
activity is strongly related to power consumption in combinational logic circuits since
significant power is consumed only during logic transitions. Therefore, the switching
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1: Power Signature Example associated with Circuit’s Struc-
ture
(a) The Front loaded Circuit Example
(b) The Rear Loaded Circuit Example
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Table 3.1: The Truth Table for Two Input NAND Gate
A B O
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
• Minterms of NAND gate = Z(X, Y ) = XY +XY +XY =
∑
m(0,1,2)
• Maxterms of NAND gate = Z(X, Y ) = XY =
∏
M(3)
activity will be employed to both estimate and manipulate the power signature in
static approach.
In static approach, Menon et al. [17] proposed a method to estimate an switching
activity at an each gate and calculate the total switching activities for a combinational
circuit in their research. The switching activity definition given in [17] assumed that
the switching activity for a logic gate is the average rate at which its output switches
from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0. The procedure proposed in [17] is given by the following
expression:
P0 × P1 =
|R|
|R|+ |F |
× |F |
|R|+ |F |
(3.2)
where:
P0 : The probability of Zero;
P1 : The probability of One;
|F | : The cardinality of the set of minterms of the logic function;
|R| : The cardinality of the set of maxterms of the logic function
For example, consider a two input NAND gate whose inputs are statistically in-
dependent and uniformly distributed. It means that the four possible states for inputs
A and B (00, 01, 10, 11) are equally likely. F is a set with minterms corresponding to
the 1’s of the function, and R is a set corresponding to the 0’s of the function. Thus,
|F | = 3 and |R| = 1 are given by the Table 3.1.
Then, P0 =
1
4
and P1 =
3
4
. Calculating by the Eq.3.2, P0→1 =
1
4
× 3
4
= 3
16
and P1→0 =
3
4
× 1
4
= 3
16
, where P0→1 and P1→0 are the transition probabilities of
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the outputs switching from 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 respectively. Since power is drawn
from the battery source only when the output changes from 0 to 1, the discussion on
switching activity in [18] accounted only the power consuming transition of 0 → 1, so
the switching activity of the two input NAND gate equals to 3
16
[17]. As a result, the
switching activity probability can be written as:
α0→1 = P0 × P1 = P0 × (1− P0) (3.3)
For an another example of an inverter, on the other hand, the switching activity
probability with uniformly distributed inputs is given by P0×(1−P0) = 12(1−
1
2
) = 1
4
.
The following example illustrates using the switching activity estimation tech-
nique on a circuit with more gates. The custom circuit in Figure 3.2 consists of three
inputs, two outputs, eight gates, and three levels. In order to apply the Menon’s
technique to this circuit, a truth table is generated for the circuit. Then, the switch-
ing activity at each gate can be also obtained as shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4.
But, what this research mainly want to measure is the power signature of a circuit
rather than the individual or total switching activity for a circuit. For this reason,
this switching activity estimation technique needs to be improved for predicting the
power signature. So, it is revised by comparing the total switching activities by the
level. Figure 3.5 shows the variation of the switching activities by the level of the
circuit. Finally, the switching activity variation can be predicted by converting Figure
3.5 to Figure 3.6, which is comparable to the power signature simulated by SPICE
in dynamic approach. Of course, this technique is limited in terms of the accuracy
compared to dynamic simulation. However, this technique is much faster and easier
to use than dynamic approach. Additionally, it is accurate enough for this research
to make a decision for selection strategy of power signature manipulation algorithm
later. Even if some limitations exist in this fashion, it has been widely applied in the
problem of optimization of total power consumption as well as the domain of power
estimation.
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Figure 3.2: Custom Circuit c(3-2-8)
Figure 3.3: Truth Table with Switching Activity for c(3-2-8)
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Figure 3.4: Custom Circuit c(3-2-8) with Switching Activity
Figure 3.5: Comparison for Switching Activity by Level
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Figure 3.6: The Predictable Power Signature For c(3-2-8)
3.2.2 Signature Identification System. The SID is a tool designed for making
power signature measurement an easier task based on the static approach. Although
there is a tool to support the dynamic technique like SPICE simulator, an automatic
tool for supporting the static approach does not exist. Thus, the automatic system is
implemented using CORGI in this research. Figure 3.7 provides an overview of the
SID system.
The previous implementations of CORGI do not support signature detection
nor manipulation. Now, the SID is implemented based on the components of CORGI
to support the statistical power estimation technique. In general, hardware descrip-
tion files such as VHDL, SPICE netlist are needed for the SPICE-like simulation
tools; however, the SID just needs a simple circuit netlist as an input, and then the
total switching activities and the predictable power signature can be automatically
generated after computing the switching activity at each node and level.
3.2.3 Constraints on Static Approach. Static estimation is more simple than
dynamic simulation using SPICE in terms of easy of use and speed for estimation.
But the results obtained with the SID is limited on accuracy. Therefore, The results
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Figure 3.7: The System Overview of SID
from the static signature predictor SID should be validated with the results obtained
with the dynamic simulation tool, such as HSPICE.
3.2.4 Dynamic Approach. Most techniques in this area operate mainly
at the transistor level to estimate power consumption. These techniques are some-
times referred to as “low-level technique”. Additionally, the reason why it is called
dynamic approach is that the output will be varied depending on dynamic vectors
such as input pattern and time interval. For this reason, this approach is sometimes
called a pattern-dependent technique in other researches [10]. A good example of this
approach is a simulation using SPICE(Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit
Emphasis), which is an electronic circuit simulator. The SPICE is one of the well-
known simulation tool which models the behavior of a circuit containing digital and
analog devices. With the SPICE-like simulators, using dynamic technique can test
and measure the power consumption of a circuit before touching the physical equip-
ments. Accordingly, simulating the circuit with SPICE is the industry-standard way
to verify circuit’s operation at the transistor level before committing to manufacturing
an integrated circuit in these days.
Originally, SPICE was developed at the Electronics Research Laboratory of the
University of California, Berkeley in the early 1970s. Since then, SPICE has been
widely distributed and used so far. ELDO is one of the commercial versions of SPICE
simulator which will be used in this research for measuring power signature for a
circuit as dynamic approach.
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In order to carry out this simulation, the circuit must be described in SPICE
format. This format is called the SPICE netlist, which has basically a transistor
level description. Before running this simulation, it is required to know an element
of description for a gate with nMOS and pMOS transistors using MOSFET Model.
For this SPICE simulation, the SPICE netlist needs more efforts to describe the
information from scratch such as the all types of gates in a circuit, how they are
connected each other, what types of input pattern will be using, and how much
amount of time will be assigned for simulation. Figure 3.8(b) shows the SPICE Netlist
description of c17, which is one of the ISCAS 85 benchmark circuits [5]. Additionally,
Figure 3.9 describes the two input NAND gate in C17 in a SPICE netlist format and
schematic representation of the NAND gate in MOSFET Model generated by open
software, Netlist Viewer.
3.2.4.1 Analysis using SPICE. The type of analysis in SPICE are
largely divided into three types. These types of analysis are summarized as follows
[23]:
1. DC Analysis
:A DC-level-based analysis that provides data to predict the DC response of an
output to a DC voltage at the input
2. AC Analysis
:A frequency-based analysis that predicts the output amplitude or phase shift
through a circuit as a function of a fixed amplitude frequency applied to the
input. This input frequency is over a specified range and thus frequency is over
a specified range and thus frequency versus output response date is provided
3. Transient Analysis
:A time-based analysis that provides an oscilloscopic display of an output. The
output display typically is a result of an input stimulus to the circuit and is in
the form of time versus voltage or current.
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(a)
* Define Benchmark Circuit C17
* Six NAND Implementaon
* AFIT/ENG Hyunchul Ko
.include ami05_models
X10 1 3 10 NAND
X11 3 6 11 NAND
X16 11 2 16 NAND
X19 11 7 19 NAND
X22 10 16 22 NAND
X23 16 19 23 NAND
.subckt NAND2 top_in bot_in out
M1 out top_in 1 1 p L=0.6u w=1.2u AD=2.88p AS=2.88p PD=7.2u PS=7.2u
M2 out bot_in 1 1 p L=0.6u w=1.2u AD=2.88p AS=2.88p PD=7.2u PS=7.2u
M3 out top_in 2 0 n L=0.6u w=1.2u AD=2.88p AS=2.88p PD=7.2u PS=7.2u
M4 2 bot_in 0 0 n L=0.6u w=1.2u AD=2.88p AS=2.88p PD=7.2u PS=7.2u
.ends NAND2
VDD 1 0 DC 5
VIN1 1 0 pwl(0ns 0v 15ns 0v 15.1ns 5v 30ns 5v 30.1ns 0v 35ns 0v r)
VIN2 3 0 pwl(0ns 0v 10ns 0v 10.1ns 5v 15ns 5v 15.1ns 0v 35ns 0v r)
VIN3 6 0 pwl(0ns 0v 15ns 0v 15.1ns 5v 30ns 5v 30.1ns 0v 35ns 0v r)
VIN4 2 0 pwl(0ns 0v 10ns 0v 10.1ns 5v 15ns 5v 15.1ns 0v 35ns 0v r)
VIN5 7 0 pwl(0ns 0v 15ns 0v 15.1ns 5v 30ns 5v 30.1ns 0v 35ns 0v r)
.TRAN .01ns 35ns
.PLOT TRAN V(*) I(*)
.OPTION PROBE
.END
Define information of nodes 
including a type of gate and their connections
Define sub-circuit 
(NAND gate)
Define power and load source
Define input patterns
Define time interval
and display option
(b)
Figure 3.8:
(a) c17 Benchmark Circuit
(b) SPICE Netlist expression of c17
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.9:
(a) SPICE Netlist expression of a two input NAND gate
(b) Schematic representation of (a) generated by Netlist Viewer
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Figure 3.10: The Waveform of Transient Analysis In SPICE
Among the three types of analysis, the transient analysis is the primary type of
analysis used in this research. It allows to measure power signature of a circuit by
simulating instantaneous voltages and currents consumption. It also support a various
set of inputs, both random and user-defined inputs. Figure 3.10 shows the waveform
of voltages and currents over a specific time interval for an inverter generated by the
transient analysis.
The waveform of voltages provides the logic transitions over the time, but the
current waveform shows the power signature which the power analysis is mainly look-
ing for. Based on the power dissipation model, namely P = VDDI as mentioned in
Chapter II, SPICE has an option to generate the power variation calculated by the
expression during the time interval. However, the overall shape of current (I) curve
is virtually identical to the shape of power signature, because voltage (VDD) does not
changed significantly during the simulation process. The current (I) is the primary
variable factor in the power dissipation model. Thus, by looking at the current wave-
30
(a)
Random 1 Random 2 Random 3 Random 4 Random 5 Random 6
Time (s)
C
u
rren
t (A
)
(b)
Figure 3.11:
(a) Six Cycles of Current Waveform of c264 generated by ELDO spice
simulator
(b) Six Power Signatures of c264
form, the abstract form of power signature can be readily obtained. For instance,
Figure 3.11(a) shows the six cycles of the current waveform of c264 generated by
ELDO simulator. By making an each cycle of wave form downside-up, each power
signature can be obtained as shown in Figure 3.11(b).
3.2.5 Improving Dynamic Simulation Process using CORGI. In general, a
set of task must be completed to perform the SPICE simulation. By reviewing the
summary of process the dynamic simulation, this research found a similar work which
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can be pre-defined or automatically generated using CORGI. Figure 3.12 provides
the improved procedure for SPICE simulation using CORGI. Firstly, it is needed to
import a circuit bench file, which describes information related a circuit structure
such as the type of gates and their relation. All types of gates used in CORGI
and ISCAS85 benchmark circuits can be pre-defined and stored in the standard gate
library shown in Figure 3.12. Additionally, As part of this research, the SPICE netlist
exporter was implemented as shown in Figure 3.13. All circuits generated CORGI
can be automatically exported to SPICE netlist format. Lastly, it is just needed to
modify the analysis options such as input patterns and time interval for simulation
on the exported SPICE netlist file. This new procedure for SPICE simulation can be
significantly improved in terms of efforts and time for this research.
3.2.6 Constraints on Dynamic Approach. Dynamic approach using SPICE
simulation is accurate enough to be used as the estimation of power consumption for
a circuit, but there are some disadvantages. First, it is not easy to handle and set
up the parameters for the simulation. For example, in order to measure the power
dissipation, one would have to know a dedicated SPICE Netlist description as an
input, and also apply a large number of input patterns and keep track of the current
waveforms. Secondly, It is extremely difficult to make accurate estimation for power
signature of a circuit since the number of possible input sequences is exponential [10].
Lastly, it is too slow to simulate a large circuit. Even if it were possible, the question
of what input patterns to apply would have to be considered.
3.3 Characterization and Classification
Regarding characterizing the power signature, it is needed to define the general
power signature types to make easier to know the original signature and to compare
it with the manipulated signature. Thus, the types of power signature are generalized
into four types such as front-loaded, middle-loaded, rear-loaded, and front rear loaded
signature. Figure 3.14 shows each possible signature in a circuit. These types are
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.Bench File
CSPICE Netlist Exporter
CORGI
SPICE Netlist
Standard Gate 
Library
HSPICE
Transient Analysis
Simula!on
Results
Analysis Op!on
(Input Pa"ern,
Time Interval)
Figure 3.12: The Summary of Procedure for SPICE Simulation
CORGI 3.0
XML Exporter
Truth Table Exporter
GraphML Exporter
VHDL Exporter
SPICE-Netlist Exporter
Figure 3.13: Implementing SPICE-Netlist Exporter in CORGI
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referred to as Type I, II, III, and IV respectively. Figure 3.15 describes the circuit’s
structure associated with the type of power signature. As seen in Figure 3.15, the type
of power signature can be predicted by the gates’ distribution in the four different
sample circuit. To be more accurate, such a type of signature can be recognized by
a simple mathematical way. SID provides a suitable type of power signature among
four types after comparing the region of three parts in a graph. For example, given a
sample signature generated by SID as shown in Figure 3.16(a). It is divided by three
parts by the number of levels. Figure 3.16(b) shows the signature with L1, L2, and
L3 which is the interval of an each part, called F (front), M (middle), and R (rear).
This process can be easily done by comparing the three parts of the signed area of
the region by the graph of signature. As a result of this comparison, this example
shows F > M > R, which indicates the front-loaded shape. In dynamic technique,
the characterization process is the same as the static one. Figure 3.17(a) shows an
example of power signature generated by dynamic approach with SPICE simulation.
It is also divided into three parts by the time interval like in Figure 3.17(b). Then,
the regions of an each part are compared each other by the following expression:
F(front) vs M(middle) vs R(rear)
= [
∫ T2
T1
S(x)dt]vs[
∫ T3
T2
S(x)dt]vs[
∫ T4
T3
S(x)dt]
3.4 Implementation and Manipulation
3.4.1 Signature Manipulator (SM). The primary goal of this research is to
manipulate the original power signature. Thus, Signature Manipulator (SM) is de-
vised for the purpose of transform the class of the original power signature. The power
signature is manipulated by using switching activity since the power consumption for
a circuit is highly related to the switching activity as mentioned in the Section 3.2.1.
Figure 3.18 shows the overview of the SM system. Intentionally manipulating the
amount of switching activities at a designated part of a circuit based on CORGI is
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Figure 3.14: Four Types of General Power Signature
the main function of this system. For example, as seen in Figure 3.18, a given circuit
P with Type I power signature pattern will be transformed to the variant P′ with
Type II or III power signature type.
3.4.2 Power Signature Obfuscation Methods in SM. To manipulate power
signature of a circuit, this research needs to find the primary factor for affecting
switching activity. The first one is the number of gates and levels in a circuit. Simply,
increasing the number of levels in a circuit may increase the delay of a circuit. Such
a delay is mainly caused by switching activity. Thus, the gate’s topology in a circuit
can have a strong influence on the overall switching activities of the circuit. Second,
the number of signals is also one of the main factors for affecting switching activity.
Like the number of circuits, increasing the number of signals between gates is highly
possible to increase the logic transitions. Third, the type of gate can be a factor. As
you can see the Menon’s switching activity estimation algorithm in Section 3.2.1, the
switching activity is different depending on the gate type, the number of inputs, and
fan-outs. For instance, the switching activity of a two input NAND gate is 3
16
, but
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Figure 3.15: Four Types of Power Signature according to a structure of a circuit
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Figure 3.16:
(a) A sample circuit signature generated by SID
(b) A sample circuit signature divided into three parts by the number
of levels
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Figure 3.17:
(a) A sample circuit signature generated by SPICE
(b) A sample circuit signature divided into three parts by the time
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Signature Manipulator
(SM)
Signature Iden!fica!on System
(SID)
Original Circuit (P)
Obfuscated Version of Circuit
(P')
CORGI
Figure 3.18: The System Overview of SAM
the one of an inverter is 1
4
. From this example, it is noticed that switching activity
is minimum, when the difference between |F | and |R| of the function is maximum,
and switching activity is maximum when |F | = |R|. Thus, it is realized that inverter
has the highest switching activity since inverter has equal number of 1s and 0s in its
function.
Based on these foundation of the factors for affecting switching activity, SM sys-
tem provides new two algorithms, which are called smart selection and replacement
method (Smart SSR) and Smart Component Encryption (Smart CE) method respec-
tively. Regarding the Smart SSR method, it is implemented based on the random SSR
in CORGI 1.0. Only difference between random and smart SSR is to apply smart se-
lection strategy instead of random selection as shown in the Table 3.2. Such a circuit
selection is performed depending on the user-defined part of a circuit such as front,
middle, and rear. For example, when performing the obfuscation with FrontLevelT-
woGates option, the two gates in the 30% of front level of circuit are selected and
then replace semantically equivalent three gates from the CORGI library at random
as iteratively. As a result of the iteration, it is expected to increase the number of
gates at the front part of a circuit toward power signature with Type I. The other
options in Table 3.2 are also performed as the same manner.
If the expected waveform were not obtained after applying the smart SSR,
the second method will be used. It is implemented by adding more signals using
component encryption method, which is developed by Koranek [13]. This new method
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Table 3.2: Smart Selection Strategies For Smart SSR
Selection Algorithm Description
FrontLevelTwoGates Selects a gate in 30% of front level at random,
and replacement to two gates with high switching
activity selected at random (± 1 level)
MiddleLevelTwoGates Same as FrontLevelTwoGates except the the gate
in 30% of middle level is selected
RearLevelTwoGates Same as MiddleLevelTwoGates except the the
gate in 30% of rear level is selected
FrontRearLevelTwoGates Same as RearLevelTwoGates except the the gate
in 30% of both front and rear level is selected
is referred to as smart Component Encryption (Smart CE). Its difference is also to
add the selection strategy like the smart SSR. The original version of component
encryption method covers the all identified components to encrypt, but smart CE can
select the components depending on the selection strategies as shown the Table 3.3.
With this new method, it is expected to increase the number of signals by encryption
and decryption process between components.
Table 3.3: Smart Selection Strategies For Smart Component Encryption
Selection Algorithm Description
FrontLevelComponents Selects components in 30% of front level at ran-
dom, and replacement to two gates with high
switching activity selected at random (± 1 level)
MiddleLevelComponents Same as FrontLevelComponents except the the
components in 30% of middle level is selected
RearLevelComponents Same as MiddleLevelComponents except the the
components in 30% of rear level is selected
3.5 Evaluation and Validation
The three targets for evaluation and validation are summarized as follows:
1. Accuracy of Signature Detection
:The identified signature is evaluated using static and dynamic approach
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2. Availability of Signature Manipulation
:The proposed signature manipulation methods is evaluated by estimating the
amount of variation using static and dynamic analysis.
3. Verification of the Final Circuit Variant
:The proposed signature manipulation method is applied on RSA circuit on
Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA against adversarial power analysis.
Firstly, for evaluating accuracy of signature detection, the circuit signatures
from SID is compared with the results of the dynamic simulation using SPICE under
pseudo-random and user-defined inputs. Secondly, the new proposed signature ma-
nipulation method is evaluated by static and dynamic approach in terms of signature
changing property and efficiency. For evaluating manipulating property, mathemati-
cal technique is used. Figure 3.19 shows an example of the evaluation technique for
the circuit variant to measure how much power signature is increased by the three
part of the time interval. Figure 3.19(b) describes how to divide the time interval and
the increased area between the original and the variant. From the increased ratio in
Figure 3.20, it is noticed that the power signature at rear part of the circuit variant is
increased more than 19 times from the original one.Such efficiency level is evaluated
by comparing the increased total switching activity by SID, the increased number of
levels, and the increased number of circuits. Additionally, the measured signature of
a variant generated by the previous algorithms is evaluated in terms of how much the
signature is changed compared to original one. Lastly, the final circuit variant still
need to be validated if it provides suitable transformation of power signature which
an adversarial power analysis does not recognize. Thus, side-channel analysis is con-
ducted based on the FPGA based encryption system developed by Falkinburg [4]. For
installing the obfuscated version of a circuit into the test-bed, the circuit is described
in VHDL format. From this implementation, it is validated if the circuit variant gen-
erated by SM provides the suitable protection of the secret key against adversarial
power analysis.
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Figure 3.19:
(a) Two power signatures measured by SPICE
(b) Comparing of two signatures
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Figure 3.20: Increased power ratio by the divided time interval
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3.6 Summary
This chapter defines the new methodology for power signature estimation and
power signature manipulation by the four steps. Firstly, power signature estimation
and simulation processes are performed by using static and dynamic approach re-
spectively. Second process is characterization and classification. It is also performed
using static and dynamic technique based on the four types of power signature pat-
terns. Thirdly, implementation and manipulation are performed. In this process,
signature manipulator (SM) is designed to transform the class of power signature.
Lastly, evaluation and validation is conducted by comparing the changed signature
from the original one and using FPGA based physical encryption system.
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IV. Analysis and Results
This chapter first discusses the test cases for experiment and power signature esti-
mation for the test cases using static and dynamic approach in Section 4.1 and 4.2.
Section 4.3 provides the power signature chracterization for the test cases determined
by static and dynamic approach, and Section 4.4 shows the changed power signature
transformed by the power signature manipulation method in SM. Lastly, The final
variants for an each test case are evaluated in Section 4.5 by comparing with the
original signature, and one of the test cases is validated using encryption system to
determines if the proposed signature method can hide the original power signature of
circuits against side-channel analysis.
4.1 Test cases
4.1.1 c264 : 4-bit multiplier. The c264 circuit is a combinational 4-bit
multiplier which is small version of the c6288 16-bit multiplier. It consists of four half-
adder and eight full-adder components. The Figure 4.1 represents c264 using circuit
logic gates. As a role of a multiplier, it can be performed as a binary multiplication.
Figure 4.1: The 4-bit multiplier represented using circuit logic
gates
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Figure 4.2: (a) 1 bit Full Adder(b) 34 bit Ripple Carry Adder
4.1.2 34-bit Ripple Carry Adder (RCA). 34-bit RCA is builded as a cascade
from 34 1-bit full-adders as shown in Figure 4.2. Such RCA is performed as a binary
adder in which the carry at each stage of addition must propagate or ripple through
the succeeding stages of addition in order to form the result.
4.2 Estimation and Simulation Results
This section examines the original power signature of two test cases by using
both static and dynamic estimation techniques. In static approach, SID is utilized
to generate the power signature without input pattern. On the other hand, dynamic
technique is required to consider input patterns. Thus, it is simulated under both
pseudo random inputs and user-defined input patterns in this section.
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4.2.1 c264 : 4-bit multiplier. The Figure 4.3 shows a graph-based represen-
tation of the 4-bit multiplier circuit exported from CORGI and its power signature
obtained with SID system. As you can see the overall structure of 4-bit multiplier in
the Figure 4.3 (a), most gates are located at the front part of the circuit. Therefore,
the power signature from static analysis represents front loaded shape as shown in
Figure 4.3 (b).
Figure B.1 shows the power signature of 4-bit multiplier generated by ELDO
simulator under pseudo random-bit sequence which is implemented in JAVA, which
called PRBS (Pseudo Random Bit Generator Source). In Figure B.1, such six different
power signatures are extracted from the current waveform. From the result, it is
noticed that the input pattern highly influences on the shape of power signature.
Thus, it is not easy to define an typical power signature for a circuit by the dynamic
simulation.
Additionally, user-defined input patterns are considered to simulate 4-bit mul-
tiplier. As previously stated in Chapter III, considering all possible input variation to
a circuit is not possible. Thus, this research tries to generate worst-case scenarios of
power consumption for a test case. The worst-case means generating a power signa-
ture with large power consumption. It is predicted to generate a large magnitude of
power signature. In order to consider the worst-case input sequences, it is needed to
know how binary multiplication can be performed. Consider the Figure 4.5, binary
multiplication of two positive 4-bit integer values. In the course of multiplying two
binary numbers, each bit in the multiplier is multiplied with the multiplicand. Each
of the four product is aligned according to the position of the bit in the multiplier
that is being multiplied with the multiplicand. The four resulting products are added
to form the final product. From this multiplication process, it is noticed that if the
multiplier bit is a zero, then the product is zero. It means that assigning one-bit
to multiplicand and multiplier instead of zero-bit is more likely to affect power con-
sumption of a multiplier circuit. Therefore, The Table 4.1 defines the test cases for
generating worst-case of 4-bit multiplier.
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Figure 4.3: c264 Power Signature Estimation in Static Approach
(a) A graph-based representation of the 4-bit multiplier circuit
(b) A power signature of the 4-bit multiplier circuit generated by SID
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Figure 4.4:
(a) Six Different Power Signatures of c264 by Pseudo-Random Input
Patterns
(b) Six Power Signatures of c264
Mul plicand       1101    (13)
Mul plier         *1011    (11)
1101
1101
0000
1101
10001111  (143)         
Figure 4.5: Binary multiplication of two positive 4-bit integer values
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Figure 4.6: Six Different Power Signatures by User-defined Input Sequence
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Table 4.1: User-defined Input Sequence for c264
Scenarios Multiplicand Multiplier
Initial Case 0000 0000
Case I 1111 1111
Intermediate Case 0000 0000
Case II 1110 1110
Intermediate Case 0000 0000
Case III 1100 1100
Intermediate Case 0000 0000
Case IV 0011 0011
Intermediate Case 0000 0000
Case V 1100 0011
Intermediate Case 0000 0000
Case VI 0001 0001
Figure 4.6 shows the six different power signatures for 4-bit multiplier with pre-
defined input sequences based on the Table 4.1. As expected, the case I and II show
the worst-case model due to the multiplication operation of the large numbers. Based
on this result, it is realized that input patterns significantly influence on the shape of
the power signature.
4.2.2 34-bit Ripple Carry Adder(RCA). Figure 4.7 (a) shows a graph-based
representation of 34-bit RCA which is generated by CORGI. The layout of such RCA
is very simple since it consists just 34 1-bit full adders in cascade. Based upon this
layout, SID generates the predictable power signature as shown in Figure 4.7 (b).
But, SID fails to detect the type of signature for this case since the region of three
divided part in RCA are the same each other.
Dynamic simulation is performed as the same way of c264. Figure 4.8 represents
six different power signatures under pseudo-random. As noticed, the results of this
simulation looks different from the result of SID, because statistical estimation using
SID does not consider the initial power consumption which normally needs large power
consumption.
34-bit RCA has total 69 inputs which consists two 34-bit inputs and one carry-
in. Basically, 269 input combinations have to be considered to cover all possible cases.
As mentioned many times, considering all possible input patters is impractical. Thus,
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Figure 4.7: Power Signature Estimation of 34-bit RCA in Static Ap-
proach
(a) A graph-based representation of 34-bit RCA
(b) A power signature of 34-bit RCA generated by SID
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Figure 4.8: Power Signatures of c264 by Pseudo-Random Input Pat-
terns
(a) Power Signatures of 34-bit RCA by Pseudo-Random Input Patterns
Case I through Case III
(b) Power Signatures of 34-bit RCA by Pseudo-Random Input Patterns
Case IV through Case VI
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Table 4.2: User-defined Input Sequence for 34-bit RCA
Scenarios Carry-in A(34bits) B(34bits)
Initial Case 0 0-0 0-0
Case I 0 1-1 1-1
Intermediate Case 0 0-0 0-0
Case II 0 1-1 0-0
Intermediate Case 0 0-0 0-0
Case III 0 0-0 1-1
Intermediate Case 0 0-0 0-0
Case IV 0 0(30%)
1(70%)
0(30%)
1(70%)
Intermediate Case 0 0-0 0-0
Case V 0 0(70%)
1(30%)
0(70%)
1(30%)
Intermediate Case 0 0-0 0-0
Case VI 0 0(50%)
1(50%)
0(50%)
1(50%)
this research defines some input patterns as seen in Table 4.2. Such input patterns
consists 50%/50% and 30%/70% chance of 1 and 0 input vice versa.
4.3 Characterization and Classification Results
In this section, the results from the previous section is characterized by using
the four types of power signature pattern.
4.3.1 c264 : 4-bit multiplier. This characterization is accomplished by
calculating the region of the each part of signature and comparing them. Figure
4.10(b) shows how to divide the region from the measured signature for c264. With
such a comparison method, SID provides result, F (Front) > M (Middle) > R (Rear),
which indicates the power signature of c264 is Type I (Front-loaded signature).
The 12 signatures from dynamic simulation under both pseudo-random and
user-defined inputs are evaluated by the method as mentioned in Chapter III. Table
4.3 shows the specific type according to each cases. Seven cases shows Type I and
five cases is Type II.
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Figure 4.9: Power Signatures of c264 by User-defined Input Patterns
(a) Power Signatures of 34-bit RCA by User-defined Input Patterns
Case I through Case III
(b) Power Signatures of 34-bit RCA by User-defined Input Patterns
Case IV through Case VI
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Figure 4.10:
(a) Power signature of 4-bit multiplier generated by SID
(b) Power signature of 4-bit multiplier divided into three parts by the
number of levels
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Table 4.3: Power Signature Pattern for c264
Scenarios Signature Type Scenarios Signature Type
User-defined
Case I
Type I Random Case I Type II
User-defined
Case II
Type I Random Case II Type I
User-defined
Case III
Type II Random Case III Type I
User-defined
Case IV
Type I Random Case IV Type I
User-defined
Case V
Type I Random Case V Type II
User-defined
Case VI
Type II Random Case VI Type II
Table 4.4: Power Signature Pattern for 34-bit RCA
Scenarios Signature Type Scenarios Signature Type
User-defined
Case I
Type I Random Case I Type I
User-defined
Case II
Type I Random Case II Type I
User-defined
Case III
Type I Random Case III Type I
User-defined
Case IV
Type I Random Case IV Type I
User-defined
Case V
Type I Random Case V Type I
User-defined
Case VI
Type I Random Case VI Type I
4.3.2 34-bit Ripple Carry Adder (RCA). For 34-bit RCA, it is noticed that
applying static technique using SID is impractical since it provides the same value
in each part of the circuit. It means the shape of power signature from SID is flat
line. In this case, analyzing results of dynamic simulation provides better accuracy
for recognizing the type of power signature. Table 4.4 shows results. All cases for
34-bit RCA show Type I.
4.4 Implementation Results
This section mainly shows the results of the new power signature manipulation
method.
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4.4.1 c264 : 4-bit multiplier. Figure 4.11 and 4.12 shows one of the manip-
ulation cases for c264. In order for the original power signature to Type III, smart
CE and smart SSR are applied to increase both internal signals and gates at the rear
levels of a circuit. With smart component encryption, three components at the rear
part of circuit are encrypted as shown in Figure 4.12 (a). And then, the encrypted
circuit variant again is obfuscated by smart SSR algorithm with rear-level two gates
option to increase the number gates iteratively as shown in Figure 4.12 (b).
4.4.2 34-bit Ripple Carry Adder (RCA). Figure 4.13 shows the result of
34-bit RCA obfuscated by smart SSR toward Type II and Type III respectively.
4.5 Evaluation and Validation Results
This section discusses about evaluation and validation results in terms of three
criteria as mentioned in Chapter III.
4.5.1 Accuracy of Signature Detection. In this section, signature detection
is validated in terms of accuracy. It is accomplished by comparing the results from
between the static estimation and the dynamic simulation. With comparing the
results between static and dynamic approach, it can be validated how much SID
system can be applied in this domain of research. If it were accurate enough for
measuring power signature of a circuit, it could significantly save time and effort
without having all possible pattern-dependent simulation processes. According to the
two test-cases in this research, it is concluded that static approach using SID does not
provide high accuracy for measuring power signature. But, it is realized that such a
statistical approach is accurate enough to detect the high switching activities, which
generates the peak point of power trace from dynamic simulation. Therefore, even if
SID is limited on accuracy of power signature estimation, SID system can be utilized
as a metric to evaluate how much switching activity is changed between the original
and the variant circuit without exhaustive simulation using dynamic technique.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.11: Smart Component Encryption and Smart SSR for c264
(a) The 4-bit multiplier represented using circuit logic gates with se-
lecting three components
(b) A graph-based representation of the 4-bit multiplier circuit with
selecting three component
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.12: Smart Component Encryption and Smart SSR for c264
(a) A graph-based representation of the 4-bit multiplier circuit manip-
ulated by SmartCE
(b) A graph-based representation of the 4-bit multiplier circuit manip-
ulated by SmartSSR in 500 iterations
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.13: Smart SSR for 34-bit RCA
(a) A graph-based representation of the 34-bit RCA manipulated by
SmartSSR with MiddleLevelTwoGates selection in 500 iterations
(b) A graph-based representation of the 34-bit RCA manipulated by
SmartSSR with RearLevelTwoGates selection in 500 iterations
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4.5.2 Availability of Signature Manipulation. To evaluate the manipulation
techniques in CORGI 2.0 and CORGI 3.0 in terms of ability of changing the type of
power signature, static technique is used in this research since it is confident that static
approach can be utilized for measuring the total variation of switching activity. Table
4.5 provides the summary of experiments for c264. Even though security is a great
concern of this research, efficiency of a circuit could not be underestimated in a real
world. The feature size of circuit and total switching activity could be a good metric in
terms of the efficiency of the final circuit variant. Excessive power consumption by the
large switching activity is undesirable since high power dissipation causes overheating,
which degrades performance and reduces chip lifetime. In this regards, Figure 4.14
through 4.16 shows total switching activity, level count, and gate count per algorithm
respectively.
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Figure 4.14: Total Switching Activities Increased per Algorithm produced by SID
System
4.5.2.1 Random Sub-Selection And Replacement. As seen in Figure
4.14, random SSR can highly increase the total switching activity as increase the
number of iterations. But such increased switching activities can not change the type
of power signature from Type I. As seen in Figure A.1 through A.5 of Appendix A,
there are no distinct peak points in the power signature by random SSR with from
100 iterations to 3000 iterations. Besides, it is noticed that random SSR significantly
increases the number of level as well as the number of gates. In other words, it needs
considerably high power compared to original one. The power signatures with more
than 1000 iterations shows more than seven times large total switching activity, the
number of level, and gates compared to the original circuit. From this observation,
this research decides that more than 1000 iterations of SSR algorithm cannot be
applied in new obfuscation algorithm. As seen in Table 4.5, however, it is realized
that random SSR does not provide a suitable variant with changed the type of power
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Figure 4.15: Level Increased per Algorithm
Figure 4.16: Gate Increased per Algorithm
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signature from the original signature (Type I), and it does shows low efficiency due
to the properties of highly increasing the number of gates and levels.
4.5.2.2 Component Fusion. As you can see the Figure A.6 and A.7
of Appendix A, the two trials shows additional peak points compared to the power
signature generated by random SSR. Additionally, it is noticed that they provides a
better efficiency because they do not highly increase the number of gates and levels
from the original one due to the circuit synthesis algorithm. But, component fusion
does also preserve the original power signature, Type I.
4.5.2.3 Component Encryption. From two trials of component en-
cryption, the second trial finally provides the changed type of signature, Type II. As
seen in Figure A.9 of Appendix A, overall shape of power signature is significantly
changed compared to the original one. Besides, component encryption does not also
significantly increase the number of levels and gates like component fusion. From
this observation, it is decided that component encryption is the best candidate to be
applied into the new power signature obfuscation method in this research.
4.5.2.4 Signature Manipulator (SM). This section mainly discusses
about how much the proposed methods can change the power signature from the
original one for test cases. Figure 4.18 shows the comparison between the original sig-
nature and the final variant generated by new method for c264 under six different input
patterns as defined in Section 4.3. For evaluating each cases, mathematical method
is applied as mentioned in Chapter III. Figure 4.18 and 4.19 shows the comparison
method and result for the case I of c264. According to the result in Figure 4.19, it is
noticed that the power signature in the rear part is 19 times increased, which shows
Type III. This case does successfully change the original power signature from Type I
to Type III. Such an evaluation process proves that SM has an ability to intentionally
manipulate the shape of original power signature. As the same process with the Case
I of c264, evaluation is performed for c264 and 34-bit RCA. As seen in Table 4.6, five
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Table 4.6: Evaluation of Changing Power Signature with Rear-level Selection Strat-
egy for c264
Scenarios Original
Signature
Changed
Signature
Front Middle Rear
Case I Type I Type III 103% 321% 1982%
Case II Type I Type III 144% 417% 426%
Case III Type II Type II 171% 467% 198%
Case IV Type I Type II 173% 467% 199%
Case V Type I Type III 99% 134% 732%
Case VI Type II Type III 96% 378% 579%
cases out of six do successfully change the type of power signature. Only the case
III does not provide suitable transformation of power signature from Type II. Table
4.7 and 4.8 provide the summary of evaluation for 34-bit RCA variant generated by
smart SSR algorithm with MiddleLevelTwoGates and RearLevelTwoGates option re-
spectively. For the cases of 34-bit RCA, SM system can completely change the type of
power signature from Type I. Even if all cases transform the original power signature,
the changed type is not consistent with the predicted one. For example, in Figure
4.6, although the smart SSR with MiddleLevelTwoGates option is performed toward
Type II, all results provides Type III as unexpected. It is noted that there are three
reasons for this unexpected results. Firstly, the changed type of power signature can
be varied based on time interval. The evaluated results in this section are extracted
based on the time interval of the original circuit. The second reason is that smart CE
algorithm is not applied in this case of 34-bit RCA, because the components in RCA
cannot be identified using CORGI. This issue is because Component ID system in
CORGI does not have the components in the RCA. Before solving this issue, smart
SSR is applied alone for this test-case. The third reason is that it is not easy to
remove or decrease the initial peak point in the power signature since the proposed
method only focuses on more increasing the switching activity than decreasing the
one. Thus, the initial peak point is still remained after manipulation process.
4.5.3 Verification of the Final Circuit Variant. Lastly, the proposed power
signature manipulation method still need to be validated if it provides suitable trans-
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Figure 4.17: Comparison Between Original c264 and Obfuscated ver-
sion of c264 by Smart Component Encryption and Smart SSR with
Rear-level selection strategy
(a) Case I through Case III
(b) Case IV through Case VI
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Figure 4.18: Comparison of Power Signature for case I between the
original of c264 and the variant generated by Smart Component En-
cryption and Smart SSR with Rear-level selection strategy under user-
defined inputs
(a) Two Power Signatures in Case I
(b) Comparion of the Amount of the Current with Color
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Figure 4.19: Evaluation for Case I of c264
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Figure 4.20: Conducting side-channel analysis using FPGA based
Encryption System designed by Falkinburg [4]
(a) A Polymorphic Circuit using Three Different Adders designed by
Falkinburg
(b) A Polymorphic Circuit using Three RCA Adders with Type I, Type
II, and Type III generated by Power Signatuer Manipulation Method
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Table 4.7: Evaluation of Changing Power Signature with Middle-level Selection
Strategy for 34-bit RCA
Scenarios Original
Signature
Changed
Signature
Front Middle Rear
Case I Type I Type III 103% 135% 478%
Case II Type I Type III 81% 110% 200%
Case III Type I Type III 122% 168% 504%
Case IV Type I Type III 77% 107% 206%
Case V Type I Type III 98% 123% 326%
Case VI Type I Type III 68% 119% 152%
Table 4.8: Evaluation of Changing Power Signature with Rear-level Selection Strat-
egy for 34-bit RCA
Scenarios Original
Signature
Changed
Signature
Front Middle Rear
Case I Type I Type IV 267% 185% 565%
Case II Type I Type III 159% 307% 472%
Case III Type I Type III 259% 239% 1253%
Case IV Type I Type III 165% 302% 1103%
Case V Type I Type IV 283% 244% 487%
Case VI Type I Type III 141% 304% 468%
formation of power signature which an adversarial power analysis does not recognize.
Thus, side-channel analysis is conducted based on the FPGA based encryption system
developed by Falkinburg [4]. For this validation process, 34-bit RCA is utilized. Thus,
34-bit RCA is manipulated by the signature manipulation algorithm toward Type I,
Type II, and Type III and generated in VHDL format to apply on the polymorphic
circuit designed by Falkinburg [4] as seen in Figure 4.21(a). Figure 4.21(b) describes
that the three adders in Figure 4.21(a) are replaced with the generated three types of
34-bit RCA based on the purpose to randomize the power signature.
Figure 4.21 shows Falkinburg’s results and comparison between the baseline and
the randomized signature obtained by his polymorphic circuit design. As seen in Fig-
ure 4.21(b), the power signature was successfully randomized to protect secret key
from the power trace [4]. In order for the redesigned circuit to achieve such a pro-
tection, the circuit is applied on Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA, and simulation is performed.
Figure 4.22 shows the result from the simulation. Visually, it is also not easy to de-
tect the key from the generated trace. But, the power traces does not be analyzed
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(b)
Figure 4.21: Randomizing Power Signature developed by Falkinburg
[4]
(a) Falkinburg’s original power signature of 512-bit RSA(baseline)
(b) The power signature of 512-bit RSA Obtained with Falkinburg’s
Randomized Power Signature Method
Figure 4.22: Randomized Signature obtained with manipulated 34-bit RCA (Type
I, Type II, and Type III)
using detailed signal process to be validated whether or not it provides the suitable
protection of the secret key from adversarial power analysis.
4.6 Summary
This chapter shows the results associated with the four steps as defined in
Chapter III. Firstly, power signature estimation and simulation processes shows the
original power signature for c264 and 34-bit RCA estimated and simulated by static
and dynamic approach. Secondly, characterization and classification process provides
the type of power signature based on the four types of power signature patterns.
Thirdly, implementation and manipulation step provides the variant of c264 and 34-
bit RCA by the Smart CE and Smart SSR methods. Lastly, the final process provide
73
three categories which need to be validated or evaluated. The results for this step are
summarized as follows:
1. Accuracy of Signature Detection
:Static approach using SID is limited to accurately estimate the power signa-
ture, but it is possible to compare the total switching activity and its variation.
Dynamic approach using SPICE simulation provides better accuracy, but the
result varies depending on the input patterns.
2. Availability of Signature Manipulation
:Only component encryption method in CORGI 2.0 shows an ability to trans-
form the type of the original power signature. The other methods are limited
in terms of signature changing property and efficiency. On the other hand, new
proposed signature manipulation method based on the component encryption
provides better signature manipulating property and efficiency.
3. Verification of the Final Circuit Variant
:The final circuit variant of 34-bit RCA is evaluated using the RSA encryption
system implementing on Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA. The result visually demonstrates
that the key is no longer visible in plain sight and appears more random than
Falkinburg’s results.
The next chapter will provide conclusions from this thesis and present suggestions for
future work.
74
V. Conclusions
This research effort has determined that a combinational circuit can be obfuscated
to hide the original power signnature information against side-channel analysis. This
chapter summarizes the research effort by summarizing the objectives and conclusions,
discusses contribution to the field of study, and establish the proposal for future
research.
5.1 Conclusions
5.1.1 Provided power signature detection and characterization. Power signa-
ture estimation is performed by using two different techniques in static and dynamic
approach. In static approach, it is found that using static technique for power sig-
nature estimation is limited in terms of accuracy of measuring power signature of a
circuit due to not considering dynamic input variation, but it is useful to provide a
quick estimate on the power signature without the cost of dynamic approach. Dy-
namic simulation, on the other hands, provides better accuracy for measuring power
signature than static estimation. But, it must contain dynamic factors such as input
pattern and time interval. From experiments using static and dynamic approach, it is
shown that static approach provides 75% accuracy for 4-bit multiplier, but is limited
to smaller circuit for an accurate result. The accuracy of the simulation results varies
based on many facts, such as input patterns, complexity of the gate connections, gate
types, and operational temperature.
5.1.2 Provided power signature manipulation method. In order to achieve
the primary goal of this research, smart SSR and smart CE methods are developed for
a circuit obfuscation which is implemented by increasing the number of circuits and
the number of signals at the designated part of a circuit to change switching activity
at such a selected portion. With these methods, 4-bit multiplier and 34-bit RCA are
successfully changed in terms of their overall structure intentionally (85% for 4-bit
multiplier 100% for 34-bit RCA). Thus, the proposed signature manipulation method
provides 90% availability for transformation of the type of power signature
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5.1.3 Provided visually randomized power signature against side-channel anal-
ysis. Firstly, an accuracy of signature detection is evaluated by using static and
dynamic approach. From this evaluation, the limitation of static estimation is found
by comparing its results with the results of dynamic simulation. But, it is noticed that
the high switching activity estimated by static estimation reflects the peak point in
the power trace obtained by dynamic simulation. Therefore, SID can be utilized as a
metric to recognize the increased or decreased switching activity in the circuit variant.
Secondly, the proposed power signature manipulation provides the best ability to alter
the class of power signature among the previous obfuscation algorithm. Lastly, the
proposed signature manipulation method is applied on RSA circuit on Xilinx Virtex5
FPGA against adversarial power analysis. As a result, the proposed method provides
the ability to randomize power signature against side-channel analysis.
5.2 Contributions
1. Implementing Signature Identification System in CORGI
Developed SAID system in CORGI based on the Menon’s switching activity
estimation method to be used for measuring an average power signature.
2. Implementing SPICE Netlist Exporter
Created the standard cell library which stores the pre-defined gate information in
SPICE-Netlist format, and implemented the SPICE-Netlist exporter in CORGI
to generate SPICE-Netlist description by combining pre-defined gates from the
cell library.
3. Designing tool to manipulate power signature
Designed new power signature manipulation technique based on the Random
SSR and Component Encryption in CORGI 2.0.
5.3 Future Work
The proposed signature manipulation method in this thesis increases the total
power consumption of a circuit since the number of gates and signals in a circuit
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are generally increased during manipulation process. Additionally, it is realized that
it is not easy to eliminate or reduce the initial peak points in the original power
signature. Thus, a future research can focus on the algorithm using switching activity
minimization technique to transform other types of power signature. Additionally,
the signature manipulation method does not use the special types of gates which
statistically provides higher switching activity than other circuits such as an inverter.
Thus, developing smart replacement of a circuit with high switching activity can be
considered to more increase the switching activity at the selected part of circuit for
the future work.
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Appendix A. Power Signature Estimation Results 1
A.1 Power Signature for c264 Circuit Variant per Algorithm produced
by SID
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Figure A.1: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Random
SSR with 100 iterations
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Figure A.2: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Random
SSR with 500 iterations
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Figure A.3: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Random
SSR with 1000 iterations
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Figure A.4: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Random
SSR with 2000 iterations
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Figure A.5: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Random
SSR with 3000 iterations
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Figure A.6: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Compo-
nent Fusion Trial 1
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Figure A.7: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Compo-
nent Fusion Trial 2
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Figure A.8: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Compo-
nent Encryption Trial 1
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Figure A.9: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Compo-
nent Encryption Trial 2
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Figure A.10: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Smart
Component Encryption selecting Rear Level Components Trial 1
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Figure A.11: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Smart
Component Encryption selecting Rear Level Components Trial 2
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Figure A.12: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Smart
Component Encryption and Smart SSR selecting rear level components and gates
with 100 iterations
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Figure A.13: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Smart
Component Encryption and Smart SSR selecting rear level components and gates
with 500 iterations
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Figure A.14: Power Signature of Obfuscated Circuit Variant after applying Smart
Component Encryption and Smart SSR selecting rear level components and gates
with 1000 iterations
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Appendix B. Power Signature Estimation Results 2
B.1 Power Signature for c264 Circuit Variant per Algorithm produced
by SPICE Simulation
Figure B.1: Power Signature for c264 By Random Sequence
B.2 Power Signature for c5355 and c499 Circuit Variant per Algorithm
produced by SPICE Simulation
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Figure B.2: Power Signature for c264 By User-defined Input(case1)
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Figure B.3: Power Signature for c264 By User-defined Input(case2)
Figure B.4: Power Signature for c264 By User-defined Input(case3)
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Figure B.5: Power Signature for c264 By User-defined Input(case4)
Figure B.6: Power Signature for c264 By User-defined Input(case5)
88
Figure B.7: Power Signature for c264 By User-defined Input(case6)
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Figure B.8: Comparing Power Signature with Random SSR
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Figure B.9: Comparing Power Signature with Component Fusion
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Figure B.10: Comparing Power Signature with Smart Component Encryption +
Smart SSR
Figure B.11: Comparing Power Signature with Smart Component Encryption +
Smart SSR (Case1)
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Figure B.12: Comparing Power Signature with Smart Component Encryption +
Smart SSR (Case2)
Figure B.13: Comparing Power Signature with Smart Component Encryption +
Smart SSR (Case3)
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Figure B.14: Comparing Power Signature with Smart Component Encryption +
Smart SSR (Case4)
Figure B.15: Comparing Power Signature with Smart Component Encryption +
Smart SSR (Case5)
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Figure B.16: Comparing Power Signature with Smart Component Encryption +
Smart SSR (Case6)
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Figure B.17: Power Signature for c5355 By Random Sequence
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Figure B.18: Power Signature for c499 By Random Sequence
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Appendix C. Power Signature Estimation Results 2
C.1 Power Signature for 34-bit RCA Circuit Variant per Algorithm
produced by SPICE Simulation
Figure C.1: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type II (Case1)
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Figure C.2: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type II (Case2)
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Figure C.3: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type II (Case3)
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Figure C.4: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type II (Case4)
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Figure C.5: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type II (Case5)
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Figure C.6: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type II (Case6)
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Figure C.7: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type III (Case1)
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Figure C.8: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type III (Case2)
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Figure C.9: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type III (Case3)
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Figure C.10: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type III (Case4)
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Figure C.11: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type III (Case5)
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Figure C.12: Comparing Power Signature of 34-bit RCA with Smart Smart SSR
toward Type III (Case6)
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